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Abstract 
Fulford’s chapter discusses the conceptual challenges facing person-centred care (PCC) and the role of philosophy in 
addressing these challenges. He is right that this role - to investigate underlying meanings and reveal assumptions - need not 
and should not be restricted to the search for definitions of key terminology. The methods of “ordinary language 
philosophy” enable us to understand the meanings of terms by systematically examining their use in context, with a view to 
mapping a term's “logical geography”. He makes effective use of this methodology to show that alternative accounts of 
what it means to be “person-centred” need not be contradictory and can indeed be fully complementary. 
The approach of mapping the usage of the key terms is necessary if we are to understand the discourse, but it is by no 
means sufficient in gaining a coherent understanding of the meaning and value of PCC - let alone one that could provide the 
basis for its effective implementation. While it is true that distinct accounts can reveal different and compatible “aspects” of 
PCC, the language of PCC - like that of “evidence” and “ethics” - is not simply diverse, it is contested. Fulford argues that 
“genuine” PCC provides a proper balance between the “extremes” of paternalism and consumerism. This language is clearly 
normative, going beyond what he characterises as the “empirical” exercise of mapping usage. A broader inquiry, based on 
the distinction between philosophy as a body of theory and as dialogue, and incorporating a direct engagement with 
normative questions, is necessary if we are to address the challenges Fulford identifies. 
The exercise of “mapping logical geography” reminds us that health discourse has no clear borders such that, by 
following its links to their logical limits, we will find ourselves inevitably in the midst of broader dialogues about the social 
nature of persons, the nature of value, agency and the basis for our obligations to one another. 
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Introduction 
 
I once argued that the role of the philosopher in any debate 
of practical import is to ask the questions others would 
rather not ask, for fear of appearing naïve - indeed, 
whatever our training, we are all philosophers to the extent 
that we are prepared to raise such questions and to subject 
the answers we receive to careful scrutiny [1]. That 
annoying tendency to ask “What do you mean?” and “Why 
does that follow?” is as much needed in debates about 
contemporary health and social care as it was when 
Socrates probed his compatriots for explanations of their 
underlying assumptions (about justice, courage, happiness, 
love - all the things that mattered most in life) in the 
Athenian market place [2]. 
With regard to the debate about person-centred care 
(PCC) there is now a growing consensus that services need 
to be more “person-centred”. While the language of 
“person-centredness” appears in policy documents 
(including, in the UK, the government’s ‘long term plan’ 
for the NHS [3,4]) such uses are frequently characterised 
by a lack of precision [5] and in the supporting literature 
we are confronted with different, sometimes apparently 
incompatible accounts of what it means to be “person-
centred”. The relationship between PCC and associated 
ideas including “personalised care”, “patient-centred care”, 
“relationship-centred care”, “shared decision-making”, 
“self-management” and even “patient activation” is not 
always spelled out clearly and consistently to the working 
populations expected to implement the developing 
strategies. This is no doubt due in part to the fact that the 
associated conceptual framework is indeed in the the 
process of developing - though set against the historical 
background of debates about organisational quality and 
evidence-based practice [2,6,7], we may wonder how long 
it will take for shared understandings to develop and, in 
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any case, the speed of the development may well be a 
function of the willingness of policy makers to engage in 
critical dialogue with practitioners and patients. 
The chapter contributed to the current volume by Bill 
Fulford [8] takes as its starting point the conceptual 
challenges facing PCC and the role of philosophy in 
addressing these challenges. He is right that this role - to 
investigate underlying meanings and reveal assumptions - 
need not and should not be restricted to the search for 
definitions of key terminology. Philosophers since 
Wittgenstein have been very much aware of the limitations 
to the search for a “definitive” account of a given term or 
set of terms and of the sheer impossibility of defining 
certain very common terms [9]. I think that most (or more 
likely, all) contributors to this volume would agree that its 
goal is not the discovery of a definitive account of PCC, 
which all rational parties will readily adopt, such that we 
can then move on neatly to the implementation phase of 
the person-centred project.  Thinking is not something we 
should aim to get “over and done with” before 
commencing practice.  In contrast to what I have elsewhere 
called “moderate anti-intellectualism” [10] or the “TV 
repair manual” approach to practical reasoning [11], the 
goal of any serious work in health philosophy is not to find 
a simple set of definitions and rules which one can 
“internalise” and then mechanistically apply across the (by 
implication) limited range of problem-types one expects to 
face in one's practice. 
Rather, the types of problem human beings seeking 
health and social care present are diverse, potentially 
unlimited in nature. This insight could be characterised as 
one of the key features of any credible person-centred 
approach and, as Fulford notes, it acts in counter-balance 
to approaches to clinical decision-making that give “pride 
of place to the results of generalisable clinical trials” [8]. 
One engages with the philosophy of PCC to acquire certain 
habits of thought, reflective dispositions, ways of seeing 
the world and conceptualising problems that will equip us 
to think and react, creatively and sensitively, to the wide 
variety of problems and unique situations one may face in 
life.  It is taken as read that the skills one acquires will 
include interpretation of what precisely it means to be 
“person-centred” in the situation at hand. What is more, 
this may not be so obvious that there is no scope for 
disagreement between reasonable people: the ability to 
consider alternative views to one's own on what PCC 
“really means” in the specific context one faces is likely to 
be an indispensable component of its effective 
implementation. In this chapter I address Fulford’s 
reasoning, beginning with his approach using Ordinary 
Language Philosophy. 
 
 
Defining person-centred care 
 
Fulford contrasts understanding work in the philosophy of 
PCC as “attempts to define person-centred care” with “the 
novel methodological perspective” of Ordinary Language 
Philosophy [8]. Instead of searching for the correct 
definition of PCC, we should be examining the use of the 
terminology of “person-centred”, mapping its “logical 
geography” in a range of social and discursive contexts. 
Looking at two influential papers on the philosophy of 
PCC, Fulford argues that, understood as attempts to define 
PCC, (which, as he notes, is how the authors in each case 
characterise their own projects) they come into conflict, 
while understood “as explorations of the use of the concept 
of person-centred care” their different findings “reflect 
different aspects of the meaning of person-centred care”. 
I am very sympathetic to this approach, having 
previously defended a view of philosophical methodology 
as concerned primarily with making explicit our typically 
implicit “conceptual maps”, a task accomplished by 
examining the links we make between different situations, 
what we regard as relevant similarities and differences, the 
inferences we judge valid and the assertions we are 
prepared to make in particular contexts [11]. However, the 
point made above, about recognition of the diversity of 
human problems being “one of the key features of any 
credible person-centred approach”, requires us to qualify 
the preceding comments regarding the search for a 
“definitive” account of PCC.  Certain core ideas might turn 
out to be “definitive” in the sense that they are not just 
what Fulford calls “aspects” of PCC: they may be essential 
aspects, such that no approach to practice can credibly be 
called “person-centred” if it does not include them.  This is 
a different use of “definitive” from the view that a 
particular account represents “the final word” on what the 
terms “really mean”. 
So the problem is with approaches to the philosophy of 
PCC that attempt to provide an account that is definitive in 
the sense of “exhaustive”.  It has seemed natural to many 
authors in the philosophy of medicine and healthcare - 
including contributors to the debates about evidence-based 
medicine and patient-centred medicine - to regard the 
ultimate goal of their activity as the production of a body 
of theory, a complete “philosophy of” the area, that 
explains its goals, methods and diverse practices with 
reference to a limited number of foundational, unifying 
concepts [12]. Based in part on (now largely abandoned) 
assumptions derived from debates in the philosophy of 
science [12] and a range of “temptations” facing 
contemporary academics wishing to provide demonstrable 
“outcomes” for their theories [13] authors have presented 
their respective approaches as “comprehensive clinical 
practice models or general theories of medicine” and 
definitive accounts of what “usual clinical practice” should 
be [12]. What, it might be asked, is the purpose of 
theorising, if not to produce a complete theory? And if 
one’s theory is not complete then is it not still “work in 
progress”? So one’s ultimate goal in theorising must, 
logically, be the development of a comprehensive body of 
theory that rules out all alternative approaches. 
Such methodological assumptions undermine authors' 
subsequent claims that their distinct approaches are 
compatible: patient-centred medicine cannot act as a 
“balance” to evidence-based medicine if the two represent 
competing accounts of the goals and proper methods of 
clinical practice. If, however, we understand these terms as 
representing “distinct ways of conceptualising practice that 
bring to light otherwise neglected or de-emphasised 
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aspects” [12], then both can have a role in informing the 
practices of their readers in contexts where, in the 
judgement of the informed reader, they help her to make 
sense of the specific situation she is facing. This seems to 
be a far more realistic and useful goal than the attempt to 
provide a definitive theory of any given area of practice 
and, if it strikes some theorists as too modest, then this 
suggests they are in the grip of an account of the value of 
their own activity that needs revising. 
 
 
Philosophy as ‘body of theory’ vs. 
‘an activity’  
My preferred account of philosophical methodology rests 
on the distinction between regarding the subject as 
primarily “a body of theory” and regarding it as “an 
activity” [2,11]. Philosophy’s value, and that of many other 
academic disciplines, particularly in the human sciences, 
lies primarily with its status as a particular kind of activity, 
the methods of thought and enquiry that activity promotes, 
the dispositions it engenders.  All thinking requires us to 
conceptualise the data of experience in some way.  
Philosophical thinking enables us to focus on the ways we 
do this, “to bring our background assumptions into the 
foreground of thought, to understand how they help us 
frame our experience” [12]. Such intellectual exercise 
helps us not only to think critically about assumptions and 
to question the validity of our inferences, but also to 
defend them when they are subjected to invalid criticism, 
and so to arm ourselves against error, manipulation and 
fallacy. Philosophy in this sense can be equated with 
“training in intellectual and moral self defence”, an 
approach that assists us both in developing our own 
distinctive positions on common controversies and in 
retaining our moral and intellectual integrity in the context 
of negotiating a complex and often confusing world [11]. 
Developing theories - pictures of the world and one’s 
place within it - is of course a vital part of that activity, as 
is the willingness to revise them in the light of experience 
and criticism. But the move from valuing the process of 
theorising to regarding its value as primarily or entirely a 
function of its conclusions or “outputs” led to philosophy, 
typically concerned with what Fulford characterises as 
“higher level concepts” [8], being increasingly regarded as 
too “abstract” a discipline to have any practical 
implications or use [11]. 
The focus on developing a “body of theory” with 
substantive implications has also led to the growth of what 
Fulford has elsewhere characterised as “cut price” versions 
of applied philosophy [14], including attempts to extract 
moral principles from the underlying philosophical 
discourses that gave them meaning, present them as the 
“products” of philosophy and then “apply” them to 
providing definitive solutions to a series of “ethical 
dilemmas” [11,15-17]. 
As Toulmin argued [18], philosophy as initially 
understood did not need to develop a distinct, “applied” 
branch because it was always inherently concerned with 
the most pressing and engaging questions of “real life”. 
His famous claim that medicine “saved the life” of ethics 
celebrated the fact that the subject had effectively returned 
to its roots, regaining a “seriousness and human relevance” 
by addressing “the Aristotelian problems of practical 
reasoning, which had been on the sidelines for too long” 
[18]. Philosophers achieved this by engaging in dialogue 
with practitioners about specific cases, learning from the 
experience and theoretical perspectives of their 
interlocutors and contributing to the resolution of practical 
problems by introducing their own characteristic style of 
thinking: asking naïve questions, making implicit 
assumptions explicit, searching for relevant similarities and 
differences, identifying the logical structure of arguments, 
clarifying debates by exposing ambiguities and errors of 
reasoning. 
 
 
Teamwork and interdisciplinary 
collaboration vs. a ‘sole trader’ 
approach  
Fulford’s preference for “teamwork” and interdisciplinary 
collaboration over what he characterises (citing Austin) as 
a “sole trader” approach to philosophy resonates with this, 
and of course with the Socratic tradition of philosophy as 
dialogue. It is true that Socratic dialogue typically involved 
the questioning and seeking of definitions of key terms, but 
as many commentators have observed, the value of the 
exercise is not primarily in the specific conclusions 
reached but in the processes of reasoning demonstrated.  
Interlocutors struggle to characterise their own 
preconceptions more precisely than they have done before, 
consider their conclusions about specific cases in the light 
of these characterisations and in the process come to 
understand themselves and others better. This is why work 
that simply presents the definitions proposed as the 
“output” of the dialogue, imagining they are adding 
philosophy to their evidence-base or moral foundation for 
practice [19,20], have significantly missed the point. To 
abstract the conclusion from the processes of rational 
dialogue leading to it is rather like turning to the back of 
the maths book to find “the answers”, avoiding “doing the 
working out” [11], or like getting a taxi to the finish line 
rather than going through the laborious process of actually 
running the marathon. Discovering the answer or outcome 
in this way does nothing to equip one to approach similar 
problems or tasks in the future, which was, in fact, the 
truly practical value of the whole exercise. 
Fulford's concluding comments remind us that his goal 
is not to give us “the answers” to the challenges facing 
PCC, but to provide some conceptual tools that might help 
us in developing our own responses to those challenges. 
While the “philosophical fieldwork” necessary for ordinary 
language philosophy has “parallels with empirical 
research”, he is aware that we need to do much more than 
map the uses of the language of “person-centred” if we are 
to meet those challenges and implement PCC effectively. 
Along with other commentators [5,21], I have noted 
elsewhere that forms of “patient-centred care” developed 
by some authors were consumerist in nature [13], 
conceptualising health professionals as “providers of 
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goods” and patients as their customers or clients. This 
conceptualisation has links to broader, ideological 
assumptions and projects [11]. Other contributors to this 
volume [22] make the important point that replacing 
“patient” with “person” (despite the crucial semantic 
difference between these terms) is not, in itself, sufficient 
to avoid the conflation of “person-centred” with 
“consumer-driven” healthcare [22] and on this point 
Fulford clearly agrees. He states that “genuinely person-
centered care” avoids the “extremes” of paternalist and 
consumerist models of care. 
The use of “genuinely” here is surely normative, 
implying that the consumerist model of PCC is not 
“genuine”.  The fact that some people use the term in this 
way does not make their usage genuine. The language of 
PCC - like that of “evidence” and “ethics” - is not simply 
diverse, it is contested. There are different interpretations 
and we do, indeed, need to decide for ourselves which is 
correct, sometimes when we know at least one of them 
must be wrong.  Consumerist and communitarian 
conceptions of PCC are emerging and we are - each of us - 
going to have to decide where we stand when it comes to 
the differences between them.  Mapping logical geography 
will not do this for us, but it might well help us to decide.  
It will certainly inform (or remind) us that a map of the 
territory of healthcare has no clear borders, such that, by 
following its links to their logical limits, we will find 
ourselves inevitably in the midst of broader dialogues 
about the social nature of persons, the nature of value, 
agency and the basis for our obligations to one another. 
 
 
Conclusion  
This is by no means a defect of Fulford’s methodology: it 
reflects an inevitable feature of contemporary life.  
Problems seem complex because the world really is 
complex, and we can either pretend it is not, remaining in 
our particular theoretical and professional silos, or we can 
rise to the challenge our complex, inter-connected human 
world presents, developing methods of thinking and 
reacting that enable us to negotiate that complexity. The 
valuable contribution that the chapters in this volume make 
is that they show how many of us, from such diverse 
intellectual and professional backgrounds, are in fact rising 
to that challenge. Ideas such as “person-centred care” are 
no longer phrases with potential to be helpful in some yet-
to-be-clarified way [23]. On the contrary, theorists and 
practitioners are working in collaboration to give them 
substantive import and application. 
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